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 The instant request for supplemental briefing presents a very narrow issue of first 
impression: How does a state’s continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case mesh with a stipulated, 
non-child-related non-disparagement clause contained in a final, but non-adjudicated decree of 
divorce.  First, principles of res judicata are inapplicable regarding the instant issue because of a 
trial court’s very broad discretionary powers as clearly established by this Court and because the 
nature of disparagement in a divorce action is likely to require post-decree adjudication.   
No party should lose their right to modify a disparagement clause set forth in a decree of 
divorce due to the nature of what a disparagement clause seeks to address.  In light of technological 
advances, more and more divorcing litigants agree to non-disparagement clauses.  Finally, in light 
of statute, case law, and sound public policy, district courts should have continuing jurisdiction on 





I. RES JUDICATA IS RENDERED INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE DUE TO A TRIAL COURTS BROAD DISCRETIONARY 
POWERS, ONLY TO BE DISTURBED IN THE PRESENCE OF CLEAR 
ABUSE 
 
In 1978, this Court held in Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) that, pursuant to 
the operative section 30-3-5, a showing of substantial post-decree change in circumstances makes the doctrine of 
res judicata inapplicable.  In the instant matter, as shown herein, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction because 
of its broad discretionary powers.  Utah Courts have long upheld the arguments in support of continuing 
jurisdiction over divorce matters when public policy suggests parties may need the court’s assistance.  An 
example of the broad discretionary powers of the district court, this Court has held that merely because the 
 
divorce judgment is silent on alimony, does not mean a final order cannot be modified with respect to alimony. 
See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Jackson, J., concurring) (construing Utah’s 
divorce modification statutes to allow alimony to be awarded at modification because court has continuing 
jurisdiction over divorce decree and that decree is only res judicata as to circumstances as they exist at the time of 
divorce, not as to changed circumstances requiring further adjudication).  The instant case highlights the need of a 
district court to maintain continuing jurisdiction over the non-disparagement clause at issue.  Continuing 
jurisdiction over a non-disparagement clause in a decree of divorce in the age of the internet will likely require 
further adjudication.   
District courts in Utah should continue to have the broad discretionary powers this Court has upheld.  See 
Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Utah 1980) (“Under Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in 
equity so far as child custody, support payments, and the like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing 
jurisdiction over the parties, and power to make equitable redistribution or other modification of the original 
decree as equity might dictate. In both the formulation of the original decree and any modifications thereof, the 
trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an appellate court only in the 
presence of clear abuse thereof.”).   
II. THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY OR 
EXPAND A STIPULATED, NON-CHILD-RELATED NON-
DISPARAGEMENT CLAUSE CONTAINED IN A NON-ADJUDICATED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
 
a.   Although the issue for which this court seeks supplemental briefing is an issue of first 
impression in Utah, strong legal basis in the form of statutes and case law lend support to district 
courts retaining continuing jurisdiction regarding a non-disparagement clause between the 
divorcing parties and not related to minor children.  Today’s social and technological changes pose 
yet another serious question for this Court. In this case, the Court should lead the nation on this 
issue and thereby keep up with social and technological changes that can so widely impact a 
divorcing party’s life.  As in this case, a former spouse can broadcast with the internet disparaging 
comments about their ex-spouse as far as Europe and China.   
 
If this Court decides a trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction over the subject 
matter in dispute, it means the parties reached an agreement that is now henceforth eternally etched 
in stone; rather, a trial court should have continuing jurisdiction, once the requisite material changes 
are pled, weigh the changes in light of the disparagement clause to determine if expansion or 
restriction is needed.  As in this case, spousal disparagement can have far-reaching consequences 
that may impact another party financially; ex-spouse hold a special position of trust to learn 
intimate details about their ex-spouse that can be exploited or used to embarrass widely.   
b.  District Court’s in Utah have continuing jurisdiction over personal property.  In Utah, 
personal property includes non-tangible property such as copyrights, patents, or trademarks.  One’s 
reputation is tantamount to personal property and one must literally be more vigilant in the age of 
the Internet to protect one’s image.  The operative section of the Utah Code allows for this reading:  
“The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders . . . for 
distribution of the property . . . as is reasonable and necessary.  Utah Code 30-3-5(3) 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
 
 The Court should find there is continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue.  
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November, 2019. 
 
       LAW OFFICE OF DAVID W. READ, LLC 
      
       David W. Read 
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